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Agenda
• Risk Classification and Risk-based SMA
• Day in the life 
• Risk-based implementation of ISO 9001
• Risk-based SMA Examples and current activities
• PCB example
2
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
www.nasa.gov
SAFETY and MISSION ASSURANCE 
DIRECTORATE C o d e  3 0 0
GPR 8705.4:  Risk Classification and 
Risk-based SMA
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GPR 8705.4
• GSFC	implementation	of	NPR	8705.4
• Establishes	Risk-based	SMA	as	GSFC	policy
• Risk	Classification	Definitions
• Nonconformance	handling
– Do	not	reject	without	understanding	the	risk
– Determine	cause	of	NC	before	reproducing	the	item	(even	from	different	vendor)
• Guidelines	for	activities	vs	mission	class
• Formalizes	sub-Class-D	risk	postures
• Ultimately	will	be	one	element	used	to	develop	project	Mission	Assurance	
Requirements	vs mission	class
–How does a project demonstrate that they are developing a Class “X” 
product?
–How do we convey to a vendor what we expect for Class “X”? 4
S A F E T Y  a n d  M I S S I O N  A S S U R A N C E  D I R E C T O R AT E  C o d e  3 0 0
Mission Success Activities vs. Risk Posture 
(example elements)
*Excerpt	from	GPR	8705.4 5
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Attributes of Risk-based SMA
6
S A F E T Y  a n d  M I S S I O N  A S S U R A N C E  D I R E C T O R AT E  C o d e  3 0 0
What is Risk-Based SMA?
The process of applying limited resources to maximize the 
chance for safety & mission success by focusing on 
mitigating specific risks that are applicable to the project vs. 
simply enforcing a set of requirements because they have 
always worked
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Risk-based SMA
•Risk-informed framework
•Risk-informed requirements generation
•Risk-informed decisions
•Risk-informed review and audit
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Note:		Always	determine	the	cause	before	making	repeated	attempts	
to	produce	a	product	after	failures	or	nonconformances
• Upfront assessment of reliability and risk, e.g. tall poles, to prioritize how resources and requirements 
will be applied
• Early discussions with developer on their approach for ensuring mission success and responsiveness 
to feedback
• Judicious application of requirements based on learning from previous projects and the results from 
the reliability/risk assessment, and the operating environment (Lessons Learned – multiple sources, 
Cross-cutting risk assessments etc)
• Characterization of risk for nonconforming items to determine suitability for use – project makes 
determination whether to accept, not accept, or mitigate risks based on consideration of all risks
• Continuous review of requirements for suitability based on current processes, technologies, and 
recent experiences
• Consideration of the risk of implementing a requirement and the risk of not implementing the 
requirement.
Attributes of Risk-Based SMA
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Big Picture of Risk-based SMA
Product	or	
Process
Conforming Non-
conforming
Risk	
Assessment
RCA
C/A
Multiple	NCs	with	no	risk	
suggests	requirements	
problem:		requirements	
change
NC	involves	risk	and	vendor	quality	
problem:	vendor	C/A,	rebuild	product	
or	correct	process	as	necessary,	
record	result
Use	and	log
Acceptable	or	no	
elevated	risk
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The GSFC Quality Triangle
Commodity	Risk	Assessment
• Risk-based	usage	guidelines
• Risk	layering	requirements	per	risk	class
• Nonconforming	and	out-of-family	item	risk	
assessment
• Learning	through	risk	assessments,	research,	and	
testing
Quality	Engineering
• Upfront	involvement	in	design
• Design	for	manufacturability
• Assurance	of	Process	Engineering	and	
Qualified	processes.
• SME	support	for	Supply	Chain	Mgt
• Inspection
• Nonconformance	and	problem	identification	
in	developed	hardware/software
Management	Systems
• ISO	and	AS9100	quality
• NCR	follow-ups	with	vendors
• Audits	and	Assessments
• Supply	Chain	Mgt
• Lessons	Learned	capture
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Day in the life example - yesterday
project
Standard	MAR	(how	
GSFC	has	always	
done	it)
vendor
Delivered	product
QA	
inspection
Nonconforming
Conforming
Reject	and	try	again,	as	
many	times	as	
necessary
How	many	
iterations	will	
this	take?
Does	the	nonconforming	
product	entail	unacceptable	
risk	for	the	current	project?
Are	the	requirements	
necessary	and	aligned	with	
the	project	risk	posture?
Did	we	learn	anything	
from	this	process?
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New day in the life - generic product 
delivery example
Commodity	Risk	Assessment
• Derating	and	usage	guidelines
• Risk	layering	requirements	per	risk	class
• Nonconforming	and	out-of-family	item	risk	
assessment
• Learning	through	risk	assessments,	research,	and	
testing
Quality	Engineering
• Upfront	involvement	in	design
• Design	for	manufacturability
• Inspection
• Nonconformance	and	problem	
identification	in	developed	
hardware/software
Management	Systems
• ISO	and	AS9100	quality
• NCR	follow-ups	with	vendors
• Audits	and	Assessments
• Lessons	Learned	capture
project
Risk-based
SMA	requirements
vendor
Delivered	product
Quality	
Inspection
Nonconforming
Vendor	follow-up,	
Root	Cause	Analysis
Risk	assessment
Conforming
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Design & Implementation (yesterday)
MPE
Parts	
control	
boardEarly
Design
M&P	Engineering	(541,	occasionally)
-materials	selection
-process	development
-drawing	development
Trade	
Studies
Initiate	
Implementation
Integration
Environmental	
test
Risk	Mitigation	
(e.g.,	qualification)
Launch
Operations
Products
Delivered
Inspections	
(373)
NonconformingConforming
Deviation	from	
standard	
practicesFailures/anomalie
s
Failures/anomalie
s
alerts
300	risk	
board
300	
watchlistReject	and	try	again
Ad	hoc	center	approach
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Design and Implementation
Commodity	Risk	Assessment	(371)
• Derating	and	usage	guidelines
• Risk	layering	requirements	per	risk	class
• Nonconforming	and	out-of-family	item	risk	
assessment
• Learning	through	risk	assessments,	research,	and	
testing
Quality	Engineering	(373)
• Upfront	involvement	in	design
• Design	for	manufacturability
• Inspection
• Nonconformance	and	problem	
identification	in	developed	
hardware/software
Management	Systems	(383)
• ISO	and	AS9100	quality
• NCR	follow-ups	with	vendors
• Audits	and	Assessments
• Lessons	Learned	capture
M&P	
control	
boardRisk-based
Parts	and	materials
requirements
Parts	
control	
board
Reliability	(371	in-house)
-fault	tolerance
-expected	lifetime
-qualification
Early
Design
Quality	(373	in-house)
- Design	for	manufacturability
- Sensitivity	to	workmanship	issues
Parts	Engineering	(562	for	in-house))
-parts	selection
M&P	Engineering	(541	in-house)
-materials	selection
-process	development
-drawing	development
Trade	
Studies
Initiate	
Implementation
Application	of	
alerts	and	lessons	
learned
MPAE	(373)	makes	
risk-based	decisions	
to	keep	products	
flowing
PRAE	(373)	makes	
risk-based	decisions	
to	keep	products	
flowing
Integration
Environmental	
test
Risk	Mitigation	
(e.g.,	qualification)
Launch
Operations
Products
Delivered
Inspections	
(373)
NonconformingConforming
Deviation	from	
standard	
practicesFailures/anomalie
s
Failures/anomalie
s
Problem	with	part	or	component?
alerts
300	risk	
board
300	
watchlist
Acceptable	risk
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Risk-based ISO implementation
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• Document organization:  written under “High Level Structure”
• Risk management is at the core
• Commitment to quality through strong leadership is strengthened
• Better consideration to how organizations evolve to improve
• The role of the quality manual is reduced – focus is more on keeping 
up with technological and societal changes
• More emphasis given to the context surrounding the organization
• Knowledge is now a resource to manage
New features in 2015
Focus	is	on	risk	and	lessons	learned/knowledge	acquisition
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• Assessors document nonconformances to requirements and 
observations of nonstandard practices
• Make first cut at determining whether credible risk is present due to 
NCs and observations, or if other areas of risk are identified
• Identify findings accordingly to the developer and affected projects
• Project and SMA organization assess risk associated with each 
finding
– in some cases, RCA is required to determine if there is a systemic 
problem
• Those that involve elevated risk will prompt RCCA
• Common findings across multiple developers with no elevated risk 
indicates that there is a requirements problem
– In this case, we move to fix the requirement
Perform risk-based audit and 
assessment
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Look for risks:  Pre-2015 vs risk-based
Pre-2015 Risk-based
Met-cal:		check	stickers	on	all	“boxes”	in	a	
room
Inquire about	which	measurements	have	
documented	accuracy	requirements.		
Check	cal status	of	instruments	used	to	
take	those	measurements
ESD:		Lack	of	ESD controls	based	on	
finding	in	high-risk	area
Determine	controls on	high-risk	area	
(beyond	simply	ESD)	to	find	out	if	there	is	
a	clear	distinction	between	where	risks	
can	be	taken	and	where	they	can’t
Use	of	materials	beyond	date	(or no	date) Assess	organization’s	understanding about	
expiration	of	materials	and	risks	
associated	beyond	the	date
Use	of	standards	other	than	those	
specified
Determine	whether	org	understands the	
standard	they	use	and	whether	they	
properly	negotiate	requirements	with	
customer
Not	meeting sampling	rate	requirements Determine	whether	org	makes	“quality	
adjustments” to	sampling	
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• Establish risk-based engineering and SMA policy (GPR 8705.4)
• Maintain a rigorous risk management process (GPR 7120.4)
• Develop and maintain has a well-defined structure, both in 
organization and process, to support risk-based decisions
• Use risk as a basis to establish process changes based on audit and 
assessment findings (e.g., metrology/calibration)
• While many in industry are risk-driven in their process definitions and 
responses to audits, go beyond that by using a rigorous and well-
documented process
• Create positions in the organization centered on risk and learning, 
day-to-day
Setting a path for risk-based ISO
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Positions Centered on Risk and Learning
• Risk
– Ensure that proactive and reactive actions are informed by risk in 
proper context of the project
– Operating at the lowest risk posture supersedes simply meeting lower level 
requirements
• Learning
– Ensure that lessons at all levels are applied from project to project 
and that subsequent assessments continuously improve in efficiency 
and effectiveness.  
– Lessons learned are among everyone’s job, but these positions are the 
leaders in applying the lessons learned in everyday activities.  
– Lessons learned are implemented in daily practices for continuous 
improvement 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
www.nasa.gov
SAFETY and MISSION ASSURANCE 
DIRECTORATE C o d e  3 0 0
Examples and Current Efforts
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Risk-based SMA Examples
• Printed circuit board coupon NC process
– Over 140 panels would have been rejected by previous process with no elevated risk (hundreds 
of weeks, $Ms)
• PCB bromine restriction
– Requirement prompted vendors to change working processes, great increases in cracking, 
crazing, and wicking
• PCB copper wrap requirement
– Requirement for blind and buried vias, costly and difficult to meet, testing proves no reliability 
improvement
• GOES-R transistors
– Overly conservative failure prediction of moisture alone prompts much riskier rework in fully 
tested system
• DC/DC converters
– Warnings about “top two” converters drive projects to much lower quality devices 
• ELC reverse capacitors
– Assessment did not properly consider moisture effects
• Semicoa GIDEP
– Low incidence concern leads to high risk rework
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S A F E T Y  a n d  M I S S I O N  A S S U R A N C E  D I R E C T O R AT E  C o d e  3 0 0
Current Efforts
• Correlation of parts failure rates (ground and on-orbit) against screening levels (1, 2, 3)
– Requirements should be commensurate with actual experiences
• Characterization of reverse tantalum capacitors
– Moisture and temperature effects
• PCB reliability vs selected standard (IPC 6012, Class 2, Class 3, Class 3/A, MIL-55110)
– Copper wrap testing complete, paper being finalized
– Internal annular ring testing has commenced
– Etchback coming soon
• Compatibility between high-end PCB standards and high-pin-density parts
• BJT moisture testing – how much does elevated moisture increase the risk of failure?
• Ceramic capacitor assurance
• Cubesat reliability
– Inherited items process principles to cubesats and standard cubesat components
24
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PCB assurance
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Impact of Non-conformances
26
• Bare boards cost $$ and build schedules 
– expensive!!
• But failures are even more expensive!
• Test sample nonconformance is not the 
same as PCB failure.
• Risk-based decisions are used for 
disposition of non-conformances.
• Non-conformances may have little to no 
impact per application.
• Began to explore origins and merit of 
requirements (more later).
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PCB Assurance – Historical Approach
PCB Design and 
Layout Activities
PCB 
Manufacture
Days-weeks
2-8 weeks
1-2 weeks
Inconsistencies between specifications, contract requirements, design drawings, production documentation, 
and coupon inspection lab submittals. Requirements were ambiguous. Voluntary consensus Standard 
requirements were interpreted conservatively, without a basis in risk.
We see a general 20-30% rate of non-conformance, a large portion is not a result of quality escapes. 
Coupon 
Manufacture
Coupon 
Assessment
Conforming 
Coupon
PCB Acceptance and 
Project Use
Non-Conforming 
Coupon
Rebuild
Many non-
conformances are not 
caused by PCB 
Fabricator quality 
escapes.
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• Traceable PCB test coupons (designed per specs. such as IPC-
2221B) are submitted to GSFC or to a GSFC-assessed laboratory.
• Reports that indicate nonconformance are dispositioned by risk 
assessment performed prior to refabricating or populating the PCB. 
– If risk assessment indicates elevated risk due to the 
nonconformance, then use is dispositioned by MRB.
• More than 170 PCB lots assessed for risk since 2014, > 85% 
dispositioned as UAI, significant cost and schedule savings.
– $M’s in cost savings, 100’s of weeks of schedule savings over 3 
years
• Risk assessment process eliminates waste and saves money and 
schedule, lowers overall risk for the project.
• The process reduces the need for repeated attempts to refabricate.
Risk Assessment
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PCB Design and 
Layout Activities
PCB 
Manufacture
Days-weeks
2-8 weeks
Coupon 
Manufacture
Coupon 
Assessment
Conforming 
Coupon
PCB Acceptance and 
Project Use
Non-Conforming 
Coupon
PCB Assurance – Current Approach
CRAE Risk 
Assessment
Days/
weeks
Risk 
Statement
Project 
Review/MRB
Code 300 determines the risk, project decides whether to accept the risk.
Accept risk
Rebuild
1-2 weeks
Cover Letter 
and Report
Waiver
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3-7 days
Days/weeks
Project CSO 
Review/MRB
Non-Conforming 
Coupon
Risk Assessment Approach
Drawing
Expected Stresses
Materials*
Processes*
Research 
Risk/ 
Consequence
*
Accept risk Rebuild
Specification
Coupon 
Assessment
Coupon 
Report and 
Cover Letter  
to Project
Redundancy
Design
CRAE Risk 
Statement
PCB Fabricator 
Input (thru Project)
Days/weeks
Reliability 
Requirements
X
X
1 - Relief through alternate 
Specifications, interpretation of the Lab 
inconsistent with CRAE interpretation. 
* - backupWaiver
CRAE Risk 
Assessment
Yes
No 1
RCA X
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The wicking is well-enclosed within
the annular rings with significant
margin, and should not violate
electrical spacing. When inspected
with IPC-6012 DS, these boards
would be compliant (max 3.5 mil
wicking + etchback).
Sampling of Risk Assessments – 1
31
Copper wicking in excess of 2.0 mil Capped via with fill less than 75%
Voiding is contained and enclosed
within the fill material (with matches
in CTE with the PCB laminate), and
does not appear to have an interface
with the cap where contaminants
could potentially trap.
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Sampling of Risk Assessments – 2
A 40kV dielectric breakdown
strength, combined with a 28V
service voltage provides a sufficient
dielectric clearance at 2.8mil.
There are at least two layers of
dielectric material present.
Dielectric layer less than 3.0 mil IAR less than the minimum 5.0 mil
Out of date drawing notes containing 
a minimum 5.0mil annular ring and 
other requirements. 
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PTH Copper Wrap Thickness 
Requirement
33
Per IPC-6012D for through-holes:
AABUS = As Agreed Between User and Supplier
Class	1 AABUS
Class	2 5	µm	[197	µin]
Class	3	&	3/A 12	µm	[472	µin]
•Thermal cycle stresses 
act on interfaces, outer 
layers experience the 
greatest stress. 
•Reason: materials 
selection and 
geometry. *reference	IPC	6012D	standard	©	IPC
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PTH Copper Wrap Thickness: Disposition
• A GSFC mission had a populated and integrated board with zero wrap; wrap planarization 
can cause 0.3mil or more variance in panel; manufacturers must target more wrap.
– Wrap cannot be achieved at required thickness for designs with tight line-width 
spacing and/or with multiple lamination/plating steps
• Requirement was introduced to IPC with minimal data
– Reliability reported to be better with wrap vs. butt joint
– Half of barrel plating thought to be “good enough”
– Higher quality limit used as safety margin against manufacturing variation during 
planarization
• GSFC Studies: Determined the impact of copper wrap plating thickness on PCB 
reliability, as characterized by thermal cycles to failure.
– Able to determine acceptability of wrap defect based on reliability testing and analysis 
in context of mission environment and duration. 
– IPC voted to change the requirement (amendment in Rev. D and revisions in Rev. E).
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Summary
• Risk Classification and Risk-based SMA
• Day in the life 
• Risk-based audit and assessment
• Risk-based SMA examples and current activities
• PCB process example
35
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Backup materials
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Risk vs Possibility
• Failure modes and mechanisms can appear through
– Analysis and simulation
– Observation
– Prior experiences 
– Brainstorming “what if” scenarios
– Speculation
• These all constitute possibilities
• There is a tendency to take action to eliminate the possibilities of severe consequences
• When a possibility is combined with an environment, an operating regime, and supporting 
data, a risk can be established – this is core to the engineering process
• Too much attention to eliminate possibilities can lead to excessive cost and unbalanced risk 
37
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Balanced Risk
(maintaining a level waterbed)
• A systems approach of looking across all options to 
ensure that mitigating or eliminating a particular risk does 
not cause much greater risk somewhere in the system
38
Try	to	maintain	the	level	waterbed
Pushing	too	hard	on	individual	risks	can	cause	other	risks	to	be	inordinately	high
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Unbalanced Risk Example
• General safety requirements dictate that anything considered "safety" 
requires 3 inhibits.
• Unfortunately, many elements prior to launch vehicle separation that are tied 
solely to mission success are put under the safety umbrella.  
• This means that by default, many items such as premature deployment of 
solar arrays or other appendages are considered a safety issue for the on-
orbit portion, even if they have no range safety effect, and they prompt a 
decision that it is always better to have more inhibits even if such a design 
prompts an even greater risk of mission failure due to one of the inhibits not 
releasing.  
• Ultimately, under the guise of “safety” we may end up with a less reliable 
system that is not more safe if we are not diligent with system-level thinking
39
Reliability	under	
the	safety	
umbrella
Reliability	not	
under	the	safety	
umbrella
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Lessons Learned and the new 
positions
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What problems are we solving?
• We unnecessarily repeat many things
• Lessons learned are not conveyed at all the right levels
• Lessons learned are not conveyed in an effective way
• Requirements do not appropriately account for our experiences
• We tend to do things because we’ve always done them
• Lessons learned are not considered in everyday practices
• Red herrings are running amok
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Events to learn from
• Analyses performed
• Technical assessments
• Risk Assessments
• Failures 
• Anomalies
• Mishaps
• Close calls
• Project conflicts
• Procurements
• Nonconformances and dispositions
• Cost overruns
• Schedule problems
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Existing lessons learned artifacts
• SMA top ten
• Watchlist
• GIDEPs, NASA advisories, and MWARs
• SMA CE wiki
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Handling Concepts, new and old
• Day-to-day responsibility within key positions 
• Requirements evaluation board
– Testing for reqmts evaluation
– Requirements changes
• Close call monthly or quarterly briefing
• Wiki communication and discussion
• Code 300 risk board, 400 risk advisory board
• MSR briefings
• Alert mechanisms
– Watchlist
– GIDEP 
– NASA advisory
• Entry into lessons learned system
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People
• MPAEs
• PRAEs
• CRAEs
• QEs
• REs
• Auditors
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Introduction to the new positions
• CRAE:   Commodity Risk Assessment Engineer
• PRAE:  Parts and Radiation Assurance Engineer
• MPAE:  Materials and Processes Assurance Engineer
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PRAE (373)
(Assigned directly to multiple projects)
• Ensure EEE parts requirements and guidelines reflect experiences
• Ensure that risk is the primary driver for parts-related decisions
• Ensure that parts entering the parts control board are prioritized by risk
– Focus on high risk parts/high risk applications
– Minimize efforts on low risk parts/applications
• Establish cross-cutting dispositions and processes for EEE parts-related 
alerts and advisories
• Maintain database of parts experiences
• Establish acceptability/risk of vendor parts practices
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MPAE (373)
(Assigned directly to multiple projects)
• Ensure materials and processes requirements and guidelines reflect 
experiences
• Ensure that risk is the primary driver for materials-related decisions and 
acceptance/denial of material usage
• Ensure that materials approvals are prioritized by risk
– Focus on high risk materials/high risk applications
– Minimize efforts on low risk materials/applications
• Establish cross-cutting dispositions and processes for materials-related alerts 
and advisories
• Maintain database of materials experiences, e.g., where process problems 
cause major project issues
• Establish acceptability/risk of vendor materials practices
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Specifics
• Review all parts and materials lists
• Invited to all PCBs, MPCBs, etc. (not voting)
• Review or drive agendas for PCBs, MPCBs, MUA disposition
• Reach-out to vendors
• Review parts and materials related alerts for applicability and cross-cutting 
disposition
• Put parts and materials related decisions in project risk context
• Perform risk assessments when decisions cause problems in project or with 
vendors
• Document all issues encountered and risk assessments
• Ensure that vendor nonconformances and notable observations get to supply 
chain managers
• Act as a cross-cutting set of eyes
• Head off problems caused by requirements overreach and creep
• Focus overly broad prohibitions into proper context (e.g., press-fit connectors, 
RNC 90 resistors, table II and III materials, etc)
• Understand common vendor practices at all vendors
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CRAE	(371)
Senior	Technical	positions	in	300
Commodity:		Tangible	or	intangible	entity	that	has	a	major	impact	on	risk,	
cost	or	schedule	for	GSFC	projects
• Expert	in	key	discipline	area	with	background	and	experience	with	reliability	and	risk
• Responsible	and	empowered	to	assign	risks	based	on	warnings,	alerts,	environments,	and	
“what	we	are	stuck	with”
• Establishes	testing	programs	and	protocols	to	keep	up	with	current	design	practices	and	
common	parts	and	components
• Sets	the	policies	for	the	risk-based	decisions	on	use	of	parts,	components,	and	
processes	
• Establishes	layers	of	risk	reduction	based	on	risk	classification	(ownership	of	GPR	
8705.4)
• Determines	the	acceptability	and	risk	of	alternate	standards	or	requirements,	or	
deviations	and	non-conformances
• Answers,	“are	we	ok?”		“why	are	we	ok?”	“how	ok	are	we?”
• Provides	risk	assessment	to	the	project	for	the	project	to	decide	how	they	
want	to	disposition
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Advisories
• Defined
– Statements warning of problems experienced in the broad community
• Examples
– GIDEP alert
– GIDEP problem advisory
– NASA advisory
– Agency Action Notice
– External warning (from MDA, Aerospace, etc)
– Code 300 watchlist item
• Generally not written with “ease of closure” in mind
• Generally introduces “possibility” of a problem and the challenge is to get to “risk”
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GSFC’s historical approach to closure
• GIDEP alerts and advisories, NASA advisories, and AANs sent out to all 
projects after careful review of applicability from GIDEP 
coordinator/representative
• Projects individually need to prove
– Beyond a reasonable doubt they are unaffected
• Some include having to provide closeout photos
– All affected stakeholders within the project understand the risk when there 
is an impact
• When projects have a direct hit 
– Provide all lot date codes
– Answer 6 detailed questions
– Get sign off from MSE, CSO, PDL in the project for use
– Even if (1) there is no risk, (2) the questions are not relevant, (3) the lot 
date codes are not relevant
• Based on “verify”, not on “trust”
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What can make an advisory hard to 
close?
• Ubiquitous part (2N2222, CWR06, etc)
• Noncompliance to a lesser-used parameter in a spec
• Parts are installed
• Parts in a component purchased from a sub
• Difficulty in tracing the entire supply chain
• Lack of root cause for problem 
• Complex technical details to describe the concern
• Problem sounds bad but may not pose risk to us at all in our context
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Unintended Consequences
• Without careful thought and context in providing the warning, we can drive up 
risk
– Semicoa laser hole
– Micropac 53250
– Crane converters
– Transistor moisture
• A huge amount of resources can go to buy down very low risk
– Vishay resistors 
– Semicoa laser hole
– VisionTech Counterfeit parts 
• There is a propensity to feel like you have to “do something” about a product 
that has a warning, before it is determined that there is risk in its use
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Example:  Semicoa laser-etching hole 
GIDEP
• Encountered on MMS
• The nonconformance is a combination of having a laser hole that 
penetrates all the way into the part and falsely passing the leak tests
• Failure requires presence or corrosive agent, pressure to have it enter 
the hole, and other conditions to cause corrosion
• Problem has existed in some form since at least as far back as 2004.
• Over time parts were collected from across the electronics community 
(ultimately ~1M) and we were seeing about 12 ppm exhibiting the 
nonconformance defined above.  
• 10 ppm is an approximate threshold for JANS part failures where red 
flags are raised, so 12 ppm just for the nonconformance would result 
in a failure rate much lower => this problem does not cause an 
abnormally high failure rate
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Semicoa GIDEP cont’d
• Responding to this GIDEP was painful and costly for projects with many of 
these parts (ubiquitous part)
• Responding to this GIDEP drove up risk for several projects
– Boards were pulled from boxes that had gone through environmental test, 
packaged up, shipped to GSFC, and inspected
– Without intervention, some boards that had already gone through rework 
were going to be reworked
– It is likely many risky events occurred that we were not aware of.
• It took almost a year of effort and a very detailed rigorous reliability 
assessment to prove that the potential for failure was well within that 
expected for MIL-SPEC parts.  
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The intent is often misinterpreted
• Some developers wait until parts are installed in hardware 
before responding, instead of using the warnings 
preventatively 
• Some will pull parts out of hardware without a basis in 
risk, or they will ignore the risk of pulling the parts
• Some believe that when we ask to assess the risk of use-
as-is, that there is always elevated risk.
• Advisory are sometimes meant only to be advisory
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How do we transition to risk-based?
• Review all advisories in a cross-cutting sense before providing to projects
– Gather SME inputs
– Determine if there is likely risk to GSFC projects
– Make all efforts to disposition at the Center level
• In “stuck with” situations, ensure that risk is captured for all options
• Do not demand information that is not necessary to assess the risk
• Create two bins
– Those that require approval from management based on proof
• Where efforts to disposition are commensurate with risk-level
– Those that report to management if the problem affects them
• Where efforts to disposition are likely far greater than the risk-level
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Cross-cutting disposition approach
• SME reviews advisory in the following attributes
– Is the advisory descriptive enough to provide clear applicability and 
direction for GSFC projects?
– Is the advisory overcome by GSFC’s normal practices?  
– Does the advisory represent a completed analysis (e.g., is there any 
question whether a part actually failed or if the author killed the part)?
• SME evaluates potential risks vs resources required
• SME works to identify broad recommendations
• SME works with projects individually as needed
• If project-specific tasks are left, then project will complete the closure
S A F E T Y  a n d  M I S S I O N  A S S U R A N C E  D I R E C T O R AT E  C o d e  3 0 0
Goal of dispositioning advisories
• When possible use advisories preventively to avoid problems when procuring
• Eliminate or mitigate risks associated with advisories
• Avoid increasing risk in projects through unintended consequences
• Properly document closure
